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Abstract
Covert channels are information leaks in systems that use resources to transfer secretly a message.
They are a threat for security, performance, but also for a system’s proﬁtability. This paper
proposes a new approach to detect covert channels from scenario models of protocols. The problem
of ﬁnding covert channels in scenarios is ﬁrst modeled as a game, in which a pair of malicious
users {S,R} is trying to transfer information while the rest of the protocol tries to prevent it. The
messages transferred are encoded by behavioral choices at some precise moments, and decoded by
a transducer whose input vocabulary is an observation of the system. We then characterize the
presence of a covert channel as the existence of a winning strategy for {S,R} and of a decoder.
Keywords: Scenarios, games, covert channels.
1 Introduction
A covert channel is an information ﬂow that violates a system’s security policy.
The term covert channel has ﬁrst been introduced by [19]. Covert channels are
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considered as a threat for information systems, for several reasons. The ﬁrst
obvious reason is of course a security issue, as covert channels can be used to
pass information secretly. Covert channels can also be an economical threat.
They can be used to transmit information (very often at a low rate) using an
existing system without paying for the service provided. Furthermore, they
are often based on an obfuscated use of resources or functionalities, which
heavily impacts the performances of a system.
Covert channels are often diﬀerentiated in terms of “storage channels” and
“timing channels”. A storage channel is a channel that uses a resource of a
system to write information that can be read by a third party. A timing
channel is a channel that modiﬁes a system’s response time in a way that can
be observed by a third party. Information leaks are also characterized by their
bandwidth, ie the number of bits transmitted through a covert channel per
second. In [23], it is considered that no system should allow a rate greater
than 100 bits per second, and for applications with high security requirements,
this rate should not exceed 1 bit per second. Several recommendations [9,23]
have deﬁned policies to handle covert channels. It is recommended [23] to
systematically try to detect covert channel with formal techniques. When a
covert channel is discovered, it is then required to document it with scenarios
of use, and to compute its bandwidth. It is generally admitted that closing
all covert channels is impossible [22]. Very often closing means suppressing
accesses to all resources used for information passing. It would then resume
to avoiding all shared resources, message acknowledgments in protocols, and
even internal clocks in computers! A more sensible solution is to add noise on a
known covert channel (for example by accessing randomly the resources used)
to limit its bandwidth. Another solution is to monitor covert channels use,
hence allowing to take appropriate decisions when illegal information ﬂows are
detected.
A characterization of covert channels has ﬁrst been proposed as a conﬁne-
ment problem in information systems. The conﬁnement notion in information
systems deﬁnes for each user the services he can access and the users he is
allowed to communicate with. Covert channels can be used to transfer in-
formation outside this conﬁnement zone. Security models for this vision of
systems are deﬁned in [4,3], and several approaches to detect indirect infor-
mation ﬂows have been proposed: shared resources matrices [18], axiomatic
approaches [1]... More recently, the existence of covert channels has been
deﬁned through non-interference properties [12,10] as follows: there is non-
interference between a set of users U and a set of users U ′ if and only if
“what U does has no eﬀect on what U ′ can see” [12]. Non-interference is
also questioned [30] as the transfer of a single bit of information causes a
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non-interference violation. Several approaches to non-interference have been
proposed, through typing [34] (a system contains an interference if it cannot
be correctly typed), or using process algebra [20]. Very often, non-interference
approaches classify data and processes of a system according to two security
levels, high and low. High-level processes can access any data in the system
and communicate with all other high processes, while low-level processes are
not allowed to read information from the high level, either directly or indi-
rectly.
Note also that conﬁnement and non-interference both assume that illegal
information ﬂows occur when the communicating parties are not allowed to
send information to each other. However, illegal information ﬂows may exist
over legal information transfers. This kind of covert channel is often called
“legitimate channel” [21]. A classical example is watermarking: it is possible
to add covert information to a legal information ﬂow just by altering some bits.
However, the search for covert channels does not usually address the contents
of legal data, which is more a steganography problem. Another possibility is
to hide data in some useless parts of protocol frames to pass covert information
in a legal data ﬂow [28]. This kind of covert channel is frequent, but can be
easily detected and closed. Another possibility in protocols is to use the way
information is passed from a participant to another to encode information.
This is not a conﬁnement or non-interference problem, as the information ﬂow
is allowed between participants. This is not either a steganography problem,
as the message transferred is not altered. Such a situation can be considered
as a “protocol-based” covert channel. In fact, the protocol itself is used as
a resource in more classical covert channels to store data. Detecting such
covert channels is far more diﬃcult, as they involve several messages in the
protocol. Of course, protocol-based covert channels detection addresses the
problem of illegal information ﬂow in a less generic way than non-interference,
as it makes an initial assumption on how data is encoded. However, data
passing is not deﬁned as the detection of an altered behavior, as participants
to a protocol-based covert channel all behave normally.
For a more complete bibliography on covert channels, interested readers
are referred to [31]. This paper proposes a scenario framework to detect poten-
tial “protocol based” covert channels. Using scenarios has several advantages:
ﬁrst, scenarios are often the ﬁrst information one can obtain about a system’s
behavior. They are also used to describe systems requirements. Detecting
covert channels at early stages of a system’s development can help modify-
ing the systems when modiﬁcations can still be done at reasonable cost. A
second reason for the use of scenarios is that several recommendations ask to
document covert channels use with such models. Studying covert channels
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directly from scenarios provides immediately examples to document an illegal
information ﬂow.
In addition to these considerations, scenarios can be used as a partial
knowledge of a system’s behavior. Indeed, it is often very hard to obtain a
model of a system. Scenarios are good candidates to capture most common
behaviors of a system. Then, from this model, a covert channel analysis can
be performed. It may be argued that scenarios model only a part of a system,
and hence may miss some illegal ﬂows. The study we propose in this paper
does not claim to be exhaustive, and it is generally admitted that a gap al-
ways exists between a model and its implementation. This gap may be due
to implementation details, or to simpliﬁcations in the model. Consequently,
a model-based study can miss some covert channels, or a contrario exhibit
unrealistic scenarios. Our scenario based approach has the same drawback,
and only reveals “potential covert channels”, the existence of which should be
tested on a real implementation of a protocol. However, one should keep in
mind that scenarios are intended to represent in an abstract way executions
that will be present in an implementation (if they are considered as a set of re-
quirements) or that exist in an implementation (if they represent output traces
of an implemented system). For this reason, we think that a covert channel
identiﬁed on scenarios has many chances to be usable in an implementation.
The approach proposed is to start from a scenario description of a system.
From this description, a covert channel is modeled as a game in which a pair of
corrupted users {S,R} try to send information while the rest of the protocol
is trying to prevent this information ﬂow. A covert channel exists if {S,R}
has a winning strategy in the game, and if R can decode the message that is
transmitted with a transducer built from the strategy. The main contribution
of the paper is an algorithm that partitions the game’s arena into two subsets
of vertices: one subset Y from which information encoding is possible, and its
complementary X, from which information encoding is not ensured. If Y is
not empty, then it is shown that a winning strategy to encode information of
arbitrary size exists from any vertex of Y .
This approach is close to a deﬁnition of non-interference for scenarios, but
presents several advantages. First, covert channels are not characterized as
the possibility to send a single bit, as often in non-interference frameworks,
but rather as the possibility to encode and decode a message of arbitrary size.
In addition to this, using strategy with memory allows for the introduction of
some intelligence in attackers’ behaviors. Another interest of our approach is
that it does not need to consider security levels or a distinction between high
and low security levels, which allows to consider legitimate channels.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the scenario notation
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we use in the paper. Section 3 gives an example of how information can
be encoded using a protocol’s functionalities. Section 4 recalls some basic
deﬁnitions for game theory that will be used to characterize covert channels.
Section 5 characterizes potential covert channel presence in scenarios, and
gives an algorithm to detect them. Section 6 shows how to build a decoder
for a given covert channel, and section 7 concludes this work.
2 Scenarios basics
Scenario languages have met a great interest this last decade. Several lan-
guages have been proposed recently: Message Sequence Charts [17], Live Se-
quence Charts [14], UML Sequence diagrams [24]... All these languages share
a common view of behavior representation, namely basic chronograms that are
then composed by means of several operators. Scenarios describe possible ex-
ecutions as causal dependencies between occurrences of events in a system. Of
course, each language has its own semantics subtleties, but basically, scenarios
can be deﬁned as compositions of partial orders. The idea to compose partial
orders to describe systems behaviors is not new [25]. However, the recogni-
tion of scenarios as useful languages is a recent phenomenon. Before 1992,
scenarios were only considered for output traces for distributed systems. Af-
ter the deﬁnition of the language MSC’96 [17,27,26,29] and of UML sequence
diagrams [24], scenarios have been used to capture requirements. However, as
many graphical languages, scenarios cannot be used to design exhaustively a
system. They are more dedicated to the representation of abstract and incom-
plete behaviors. An usual trend is to model typical executions of a system,
or a contrario exceptional cases by means of scenarios, hence covering a large
subset of possible behaviors. So, even if incomplete, scenarios are still relevant
to detect properties of a system.
For the rest of the paper, we have considered Message Sequence Charts.
However, the approach proposed by this paper certainly adapts to other sce-
nario formalisms. Message sequence charts is composed of two kind of dia-
grams. Basic chronograms (called basic Message Sequence Charts -or sim-
ply bMSC for short) are composed by means of High-level Message Sequence
Charts, roughly speaking bMSC-labeled automata.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A bMSC is a tuple M = (E,≤, A, I, α, φ) where E is a set of
events, ≤ is a partial ordering between events, A is a set of action names, I
is a set of processes called instances, α : E → A is a function associating an
action name to each event, and φ : E → I is a function associating a locality
to each event. For a bMSC M , we will deﬁne as Min(M) the set of minimal
events for the causal order relation, that is, the set of events with no causal
L. Hélouët et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 119 (2005) 93–116 97
predecessor.
Partial orders alone are not suﬃcient to model interesting behaviors, and
some operators such as choice, loops, and sequence have been proposed. Se-
quential composition mainly consists in merging two bMSCs along their com-
mon instance axis. This is deﬁned more formally in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.2 The sequential composition of two bMSCs M1 and M2 is the
bMSC M1 ◦ M2 = (E1 unionmulti E2,≤1◦2, A1 ∪ A2, I1 ∪ I2, α1 ∪ α2, φ1 ∪ φ2), where
≤1◦2=
(≤1 unionmulti ≤2 unionmulti{(e1, e2) ∈ E1 × E2 | φ(e1) = φ(e2)}
)∗
.
The approach proposed in the paper mainly focuses on the relations be-
tween events executed by an instance called the sender and events executed
by another instance called the receiver of a covert channel, and by the causal
relationships between them. Hence, we will need the notion of projection on
an instance, which consists in hiding all events of other instances in a bMSC.
Deﬁnition 2.3 The projection of a bMSC M = (E,≤, A, I, α, φ) on an in-
stance i ∈ I is the bMSC πi(M) = (E ′ = φ−1(i),≤ ∩ E ′ × E ′, A, {i}, φ|E′).
As we assume a total ordering on instance axes, we will often denote the
projection of M on instance i ∈ I by the word wπi(M) = e1 · · · en such that
{e1, . . . , en} = φ−1(i) and ∀p < q, ep < eq.
As already mentioned, bMSCs alone are not expressive enough to design
interesting behaviors. They have to be extended with operators. A common
and widely accepted way of composing bMSC is called High-level Message
Sequence Charts [29], a kind of bMSC automata.
Deﬁnition 2.4 A HMSC is a tuple H = (N,−→,B, n0), where N is a set of
nodes, n0 is a speciﬁc node called the “initial node”, B is a set of bMSCs,
−→⊆ N ×B×N is a set of transitions. In addition, we sometimes distinguish
sink nodes, which are nodes without successors.
A path in a HMSC is a word p = t1 · t2 · · · tk ∈−→∗. One associates to p
the bMSC Op = l(t1) ◦ · · · ◦ l(tk), the sequential composition of the labels l(ti)
of transitions ti in p.
Deﬁnition 2.5 A choice node in a HMSC H is a node n with at least two
outgoing transitions. A choice node n is local [5,15] if and only if there is a
unique instance i ∈ I such that for all paths p leaving n, φ(min(Op)) = {i}.
When a choice n is local, we will say that n is controlled by i.
In this paper, we only consider local HMSCs, ie, whose choices are all
local. Such HMSCs have been frequently considered and enjoy nice algorithmic
properties [11]. Algorithms to detect the locality property can be found in
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[5,15]. For the rest of the paper, we will also need some basic notions on
graphs, that are recalled below.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A subgraph G′ of G is a pair G′ = (V ′, E ′)
such that V ′ ⊆ V and E ′ ⊆ E ∩ V ′ × V ′. Considering HMSCs as graphs
we can deﬁne a sub-HMSC of a HMSC H = (N,−→,B, n0) as a HMSC
H ′ = (N ′,−→′,B′, n′0) where N ′ ⊆ N , B′ ⊆ B, and −→′ ⊆ −→∩N ′×B′×N ′.
The complete subgraph on a set of nodes N ′ will be called the restriction of
G to N ′, and noted G|N ′ .
A strongly connected component of G is a subset V ′ of V such for all
v1, v2 ∈ V ′ there is a path from v1 to v2. For a given graph, a decompo-
sition into strongly connected components can be performed in linear time
using Tarjan’s algorithm [33]. Let us call [v] the strongly connected compo-
nent containing v ∈ V . A quotient graph G = (V, E) can be computed from
G, where V is the set of connected components of G, and E ⊆ V × V =
{([v1], [v2]) | ∃(v1, v2) ∈ E ∧ [v1] = [v2]}. Since G = (V, E) is an acyclic
graph, one can deﬁne the depth of a strongly connected component c as
d(c) = max{|p| such that p is an acyclic path leading to c in G}.
3 Sending information with decisions nodes and trans-
ducers
Let us consider a simple communication protocol that transfers data using
short or long data packets, that are chosen according to the network’s con-
gestion. Now, consider a network in which two users, Sender and Receiver
are allowed to send data to each other, using this protocol. By choosing long
or short data packets, Sender and Receiver can encode 0 and 1, and hence
add information over a legal data ﬂow. Clearly, this is not a steganography
problem, as the data transferred is not altered. The situation cannot either be
considered as violating a conﬁnement or a non interference property, as Sender
and Receiver are allowed to communicate. Of course, congestion adds noise
to the covert channel, which becomes ineﬃcient if the network gets saturated.
A HMSC depicting the main functionalities of our protocol is given in
Figure 1. Once a session is opened, a user can send short data packets, which
are forwarded as data packets to the receiver, or long data packets, which are
split into two kinds of packets: DataInc, meaning incomplete Data packets,
followed by Data Packets. From this description of our protocol, one can see
that instance sender can choose to emit short data packets to encode value 0,
and long data packets to encode 1. The receiving instance can then decode a
message by observing the respective order between Data and DataInc packets.
Note that information transfer is only possible if Sender and Receiver have
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Short Long Close
HMSC Dummy
bMSC Short
Sender Nertwork Receiver
shortData Data
open open
Sender Nertwork Receiver
bMSC Open
close close
Sender Nertwork Receiver
bMSC Close
ReceiverNertworkSender
LongData
DataInc
Data
bMSC Long
Fig. 1. The DummyIP protocol
agreed on a protocol for sending information. Note also that as a message can
be of arbitrary length, one needs to be able to perform an arbitrary number
of decisions for encoding it. Hence, for our protocol, one should not consider
session closing as an encoding possibility. Note also that being able to perform
two decisions is not suﬃcient to transmit information. The choices must have
diﬀerent observable consequences for the receiver. Suppose that DataInc
packet are replaced by Data packets. Then, upon reception of 3 data packets,
it would become impossible for a receiver to be sure whether message “0.1”
or message “1.0” was sent. Hence, despite the two possible decisions, the new
protocol cannot be used to transfer reliably covert data.
So far, we have mentioned that covert information was encoded by deci-
sions of a sending instance, and decoded by a receiving instance. In fact, the
receiving instance must observe what happens in the system, and deduce the
choices performed by the sender. Such a decoder can be formally deﬁned as a
ﬁnite state transducer [2,6], that takes as input the observation of the system,
and outputs a sequence of decisions, ie, the decoded message.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A Transducer is a tuple T = (Q,Σin,Σout, δ, QI , F ) where
Q is a set of states, Σin is an input alphabet, Σout is an output alphabet,
δ ⊆ Q× Σ∗in × Σ∗out ×Q, QI ∈ Q is a set of initial states of T , F ⊆ Q is a set
of ﬁnal or accepting states.
A transducer can be considered as a machine that reads letters from Σin
and produces outputs in Σ∗out. The outputs of a transducer T for a word w ∈
Σ∗in will be denoted T (w). A transition of a transducer can be considered as a
rewriting step. Note that transitions can contain empty words either on input
or on output side, ie, transitions of the kind (q, , wout, q
′) and (q, win, , q′) are
allowed.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A transducer is functional if and only if |T (w)| ≤ 1 for all
w ∈ Σ∗in. Note that functionality is diﬀerent from the notion of determinism: a
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non deterministic transducer can be functional, and a deterministic transducer
can be non functional. The transducer of Figure 2-a is not deterministic, as
two transitions labeled by a/0 leave state 0. However, it is functional, as the
output for a.b is 0.1, even if two diﬀerent paths of the transducer accept a.b.
The transducer Figure 2-b is deterministic, but not functional, as the word
abc generates two diﬀerent outputs, 0.1.1 and 1.0.1. In fact, functionality
concerns the output produced for a given word, and not the paths that allow
this rewriting. Checking this property is decidable. [6,32] has proved that
for a transducer with m states, deciding whether a transducer is functional
resumes to verifying that for all pairs of states and all words of size ≤ 2m
the output generated by the transducer was unique. While this procedure
is exponential, there is also a quadratic time algorithm [8] for checking this
property.
0 3
a/0 c/1
2
ab/10 c/1
1
b/1b)
a)
0
1 2
3
a/0
a/0
b/1
b/1
c)
?data/0
?DataInc.?Data/1
d)
wait/1
?data/0
?data/0
?end/
?restart/1
Fig. 2. Transducers examples
A simple strategy to encode data is to perform choices that ensure that the
protocol will eventually get back to the same decision point. This was proposed
as a ﬁrst covert channel identiﬁcation procedure in [16]. The main idea behind
this deﬁnition of covert channels is that corrupted users can exploit iterations
in protocol’s behavior to get back to states from which a decision can be taken
by the sender in the covert channel, and which causal consequences can be
observed by the receiver.
The Dummy IP example allows for a transfer of information from a single
control point. The associated decoder is given by transducer of Figure 2-c.
However, this kind of attack can be easily monitored as users iterate system-
atically the same behaviors. Furthermore, if encoding from a choice node
implies an error scenario (for example requesting a missed packet), then the
number of errors for this user will diﬀer from all users, which may help de-
tecting an attack. Furthermore, error scenarios are less likely to occur than
others. Hence, covert information transfer might result in an highly unlikely
scenario to occur.
With a minimal knowledge of a system, an attacker may however ﬁnd
some more elaborated strategies, for which monitoring becomes more diﬃ-
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cult. These strategies consist in moving the systems towards multiple decision
points where information transmission is always possible. Consider the ex-
ample of Figure 3. Let us decide that encoding 0 at choice node n1 can be
performed by choosing scenario Data, and 1 by scenario Wait . Following the
encoding strategy deﬁned previously, one can decide to choose systematically
to get back to decision node n1 by executing scenario Restart after choosing
scenario Wait , hence allowing another bit transmission. However, at node
n2, executing Restart or Resume is another encoding possibility. It is also
very easy to deﬁne the decoder for this more elaborated strategy (it is given
Figure 2-d). So, a covert channel can be implemented if the communicating
parties agree on a set of decision nodes that will be used to encode informa-
tion, and on which behavior must be executed to encode a bit in each decision
node. In fact, these encoding strategies can be considered as a game between
a pair Sender/Receiver, and the rest of the protocol. The attackers win if they
can transmit any message of arbitrary length, and the protocol wins if he can
prevent messages from being passed.
Sender Nertwork Receiver
Data Data
bMSC Data
Close
Data
Open
Wait
End
n0
n1
n3
n2
Resume Restart
bMSC End
Nertwork Nertwork
end
Sender Nertwork Receiver
Wait Wait
bMSC Wait
Sender Nertwork Receiver
close close
bMSC Close
Sender Nertwork Receiver
open open
bMSC Open
Sender Nertwork Receiver
Restart Restart
bMSC Restart bMSC Resume
Sender Nertwork Receiver
Resume
Data
Data
Fig. 3. Protocol containing a covert channel involving two decision points
4 Games
This section recalls some basic notions of game theory. Most of this material
is given with more details in [13]. To avoid the multiplication of formalisms,
we have slightly adapted the traditional deﬁnition of arenas to include labels
on edges. One can consider covert information passing as a two players game
where the attacker wins if he transfers information to its peer, and the pro-
tocol wins if it can prevent this information from being reliably passed. As
information to be passed between covert parties is of unbounded size, message
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passing will be tightly related to inﬁnite behaviors of HMSCs. In addition
to this, as covert information transfer have to use inﬁnitely often nodes that
allow information encoding, our covert game will be best described as a Muller
game.
An arena is a tuple A = (V0, V1,Σ, E) where V0 and V1 are sets of vertices,
Σ is an alphabet, and E ⊆ (V0 ∪ V1)×Σ∗× (V0 ∪ V1) is a set of labeled edges.
We note V = V0 ∪ V1, and for an edge e = (v, w, v′) ∈ E, we call v the origin
of e and v′ the goal of e. Arenas are used to model games with two players
0 and 1. An arena is represented by a graph, with round and square vertices
respectively associated to 0 and 1 vertices (see Figure 6 for an example). Edges
represent “moves”: a move consists in passing from one vertex to another. In
round vertices, player 0 chooses the next move, and in square vertices, player
1 chooses the next move. A play in an arena is a maximal path in this arena.
If a play Π is inﬁnite, we denote by Inf (Π) the set of vertices that are visited
inﬁnitely often. A Muller game is a pair G = (A,F), where A is an arena,
and F ⊆ 2V0∪V1 is a Muller condition. Player 0 is the winner of a play Π if:
• Π = e0 · · · el is ﬁnite and the goal of el is a 1-vertex from which player 1
cannot move.
• Π is an inﬁnite game, and Inf (Π) /∈ F .
Otherwise, player 1 wins the play. Let A be an arena and let σ = {0, 1}. Let
fσ : V
∗Vσ −→ 2E be a partial function. A play preﬁx Π = e0e1 · · · el, with
each move of the form ei = (vi, w, vi+1) ∈ E, conforms to fσ if for all 0 ≤ i ≤ l
such that vi ∈ Vσ, f(v0 · · · vi) is deﬁned and vi+1 ∈ f(v0 . . . vi). A play Π
conforms to a function fσ if and only if all its ﬁnite preﬁxes conform to fσ.
A function fσ is a strategy for player σ on U ⊆ V if fσ is deﬁned for any
preﬁx of a game that conforms to fσ, starts from a vertex u ∈ U , and does
not end in a sink state for player σ. Let G = (A,F) be a game, and fσ be
a strategy on U for player σ. We say that fσ is a winning strategy for player
σ on U if all plays starting from U and that conform to fσ are winning plays
for σ. A player σ wins a game G on U ⊆ V if and only if he has a winning
strategy on U . A winning strategy fσ is maximal if it is maximal among all
winning strategies for the inclusion relation.
At this stage, the relation between games and covert channel may not
appear clearly. Let us try to gather some ideas that will be used hereafter
to deﬁne covert channel strategies. Nodes of HMSCs will be considered as
vertices of an arena. The tricky point is to associate vertices to a player and
to deﬁne winning strategies in the so deﬁned game. Covert channel users can
be considered as player 1 in this game, and the rest of the protocol as player
0. First, as covert channel users may want to transfer unbounded amount of
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information, the protocol should never reach a sink node. Hence, sink nodes
in a HMSC will be associated to player 1 . Second, winning plays for player
0 (the protocol) will be plays in which information transmission is impossible
for player 1.
Deﬁning information encoding as a game strategy may seem surprising as
the protocol is not playing. In fact, the protocol’s initial purpose is not to
counter any cover channel, but to provide a service, transport information,
etc. Therefore, an attacker can be seen as playing against a protocol imple-
mentation, but a protocol is not playing against the attacker. However, even if
the protocol plays random moves, it may be suﬃcient to prevent information
passing. We will hence try to exhibit a strategy for corrupted users when the
protocol may play the best move by chance. Note however that it is possible
to win a game by playing randomly... Clearly, the encoding example described
in previous section is a simplistic game with only one state.
5 Potential Covert Channels
In this section, we propose an algorithm to ﬁnd a transmission strategy using
a complete protocol. A pair sender/receiver will win a game if it has a strategy
to transmit information. Consequently, when the protocol is in a deadlocked
state, no information can be transmitted, and {S,R} lose the game. {S,R}
also lose when the protocol remains in a loop in which no information can
be transmitted. The main idea behind the algorithm is to partition the set
of choice nodes of a HMSC into winning and losing nodes for a player, ie,
ﬁnd nodes from which a player has a strategy to win the game. Intuitively, a
“good” move for covert channel users will be a move after which player 1 will
eventually be able to encode data and keep the control of the protocol, or a
move that will force the opponent to perform a move for which we still have
a winning strategy.
Let X be a set of nodes in an arena and σ be a player. Recall that the
σ-attractor of X is the set of nodes from which player σ can force its opponent
to move to a node of X. It is deﬁned by Attσ(X)=
⋃
k Att
k
σ(X), where:
Att0σ(X) = X
Attn+1σ (X) = Att
n
σ(X) ∪ {m ∈ Vσ | ∃n ∈ Attnσ(X), ∃e = (m,w, n) ∈ E}
∪ {m ∈ V1−σ | e = (m,w, n) ∈ E ⇒ n ∈ Attnσ(X)}
The notion of attractor will be useful to capture the notion of vivacity
needed to transfer messages of unbounded size. The deﬁnitions proposed so
far will be used mainly to detect who can control a part or another of a pro-
tocol. However, controlling a protocol is not suﬃcient to make sure that data
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can be transmitted. For the simple cycle-based strategy described Section 3,
data encoding was possible if diﬀerent choices had diﬀerent observable conse-
quences. As we are now deﬁning more elaborated strategies, we have to deﬁne
the possibility of passing data in a more general way.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Let H be a HMSC and R be an instance of H . For a given
transition t = (n,M, n′) of a H , we will deﬁne as λR(t) = α(wπR(M)) the
observation of t on R. The deﬁnition can be extended to any path p of H
writing λR(t · p) = λR(t) · λR(p).
As already mentioned, the receiver in a covert channel tries to deduce the
actions performed by the sender from its observation of the running system.
Roughly speaking, λR deﬁnes the sequences of events observed when a scenario
is executed.
Deﬁnition 5.2 Let H be a HMSC, C be a set of nodes ofH , R be an instance,
and p be a path of C. We deﬁne as ΛR(C, p) = {λR(p.s) | p.s is a path of H|C},
the set of words generated by paths starting with a preﬁx p. One can see
ΛR(C, p) as the possible observations on R when path p is imposed as a start.
Note that while the trace language of a HMSC is in general not regular, its
projection on a given instance is regular (hence so is ΛR(C, p)).
In this deﬁnition, the path p should be interpreted as a sequence of choices
performed by the sender, and ΛR(C, p) as the set of possible visible conse-
quences (from the receiver’s point of view) when only transitions of the con-
nected component C are chosen.
Deﬁnition 5.3 Let D be a strongly connected component of a HMSC H . We
will say that a choice node m encodes no information in a strongly connected
component D and write E(D,m) iﬀ either S does not control m, or for all
t = (m, b1, n1), t
′ = (m, b2, n2) such that n1, n2 ∈ D we have ( ∪ ΛR(D, t)) ∩
ΛR(D, t
′) = ∅ or ( ∪ ΛR(D, t′)) ∩ ΛR(D, t) = ∅
More informally, E(D,m) holds iﬀ it is impossible for R to diﬀerentiate
two choices of S starting from m. Furthermore, when E(D,m) holds, then
it is possible to loop forever on vertex m without transferring information.
Note that E(D,m) can be due to some kind of non-determinism, but also
to the emptiness of observable actions for a receiver. When E(D,m) holds
for all nodes of D, then the strongly connected component D cannot be used
to transmit data. If a protocol can force a pair sender/receiver to stay in a
strongly connected component D where no event is observable or the sequence
of events observed is always the same independently from the choices of the
sender, then no data transmission is possible in D. Note that E({n}, n) holds
trivially when n is a sink node.
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Fig. 4. Property E
Consider the graph in Figure 4-a, depicting a strongly connected compo-
nent D = {n0, n1, n2} of a HMSC. Nodes are HMSC nodes, and transitions
from one node to another are labeled by λR(t). E(D, n0) holds, as the language
observed by R after transition (n0, a, n1) is {abc; ad}∗, while that observed
after transition (n0, ab, n2) is {abc}.{abc; ad}∗. E(D, n2) also holds, as n2 con-
tains a non observable transition (labeled by ). However, if n1 is controlled by
the sending instance, E(D, n1) does not hold, as for the two transitions leav-
ing n1, the observable consequences generated form disjoint languages. Hence,
D can be used to encode information. If we consider the strongly connected
component D′ = {n0, n1, n2, n3, n4, n5} in Figure 4-b, E(D′, x) trivially holds
for x ∈ {n1, n2, n3, n4, n5}, as these nodes only have a single outgoing tran-
sition. If n0 is controlled by the sending instance, E(D
′, n0) does not hold,
and starting with a transition labeled with a or with d is suﬃcient to generate
observable information, even if the output {abcfe} can be generated via two
diﬀerent choices.
Now that zones where data transmission is possible are identiﬁed, let us
compute the winning zones for a HMSC. For the sending instance, winning
zones are zones where data transmission is possible without losing control of
the channel, and for the protocol, winning zones are zones from which inﬁnite
data transmission is impossible. Obviously, sink nodes are winning zones for
the protocol. In a similar way, all connected components controlled by the
protocol are also winning for this player. Finally, a zone that is not entirely
controlled by the protocol but does not allow for data transmission is also a
winning zone for the protocol. The 0-attractor of these 3 cases is also a winning
subset for the protocol (where 0 is the player representing the protocol).
The covert channel game is an iterated reachability game. In fact, cor-
rupted users want the protocol to pass inﬁnitely often in nodes where in-
formation encoding is possible. Let H = (N,−→,B, l) be a HMSC. The
arena associated to H is deﬁned as AH = (N0, N1,Σ, E), where N0 = {n ∈
N | n choice node ∧ neither S nor R control n}, N1 = N − N0, Σ = λR(B),
E = {(n, λR(b), n′)) | (n, b, n′) ∈ −→}. As stated before, we want to deﬁne a
covert channel as a Muller game allowing inﬁnite encoding, that is, whose in-
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ﬁnite plays can traverse inﬁnitely often encoding nodes. We ﬁrst partition the
arena in two sets, Y from which an inﬁnite encoding will always be possible,
and X from which no encoding or only bounded encoding will be possible.
algorithm: Partition(AH)
X = ∅ (Winning set for the protocol)
Y = ∅ (Winning set for the pair Sender/Receiver)
CC = Tarjan(H) /* computes the strongly connected components
of H */
Stack = Stack with connected components ordered by depth (deepest on
top)
while Stack = ⊥ do
D = POP (Stack)
if D ∩ Y = ∅ then Case (1)
D := D − Y
if D = ∅ then
PUSH (Tarjan(D))
end if
else
if ∃m ∈ D,¬E(D,m) then
if D ⊆ AttRS({m} ∪ Y ) then Case (2)
Y = AttRS({m} ∪ Y )
else Case (3)
PUSH (Tarjan(D ∩ AttRS({m} ∪ Y )))
PUSH (Tarjan(D − AttRS({m} ∪ Y )))
end if
else Case (4)
/* here, D ∩ Y = ∅ and E(D,m) for all m ∈ D */
X = X ∪D
end if
end if
end while
The algorithm computes a set of nodes X from which the protocol has a
strategy to prevent S and R from passing information of arbitrary length, and
Y , the complement of X. If Y is not empty, then there is potentially a covert
channel from S to R in the protocol. This algorithm studies successively con-
nected components in the arena associated to a scenario description. For each
connected component, several cases depicted Figure 5 may occur. The impor-
tant invariant of the algorithm is that at all stages Y is the {S,R}-attractor
of the encoding states found so far. Note also that any transition leaving a
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connected component leads to a vertex located in a deeper component. Hence,
the classiﬁcation of nodes of a connected component as X or Y node at depth
n can rely on classiﬁcation of nodes of all components at depth n + 1. Every
time a component D is studied, it is either stable with respect to the set Y
computed so far, and can be added to X or Y , or unstable, and is split into
sub-components.
In case 1, D ∩ Y is not empty. Nothing can be deduced yet for D, and the
study must be reﬁned for all connected components of D − Y .
In case 2, ∃m ∈ D,¬E(D,m) and D ⊆ AttRS({m} ∪ Y ). Hence, from
any node of D, S and R can force the protocol to get back to m, or move
towards a node of Y. So, D can be added to Y, and as we want Y to be closed
by attraction, Y = AttRS({m} ∪ Y ).
In case 3, ∃m ∈ D,¬E(D,m), as in case 2, but D  AttRS({m} ∪ Y ).
So there are some nodes of D from which it is still possible for the protocol
to avoid m or all nodes of Y . So, we have to reﬁne the search in connected
components of D∩ AttRS({m} ∪ Y ) and D− AttRS({m} ∪ Y ).
In case 4, D is a connected component, and does not contain nodes allowing
information transfer. Furthermore, as D∩Y is empty, it is impossible to leave
D to reach a part of the arena where data transfer is possible. Hence, D can
be added to X.
D
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D
Y
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Fig. 5. Diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the algorithm
Let us apply this algorithm on the example of Figure 6. Strongly connected
components CCi of this arena are identiﬁed by dashed rectangles. Nodes
controlled by the pair Sender/receiver are symbolized by squares, and nodes
controlled by the rest of the protocol are symbolized by circles. Sink nodes
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are supposed to be controlled by the pair sender/receiver. They are obviously
winning nodes for the protocol, as it is the attacker’s turn to move, and no
move is allowed from these nodes.
We ﬁrst start with CC7.CC5.CC6.CC4.CC3.CC8.CC2.CC1 in the stack,
and with X = ∅, Y = ∅. The ﬁrst ﬁve steps of the algorithm are trivial, since
E(CCi, n) holds for all nodes n ∈ CCi and i ∈ 3..7. (Observe indeed that no
choice node of these CCi is controlled by {S,R}.) Then, case 4 applies, and
it just consists in adding vertices of these connected components to X. After
step 5, we hence have X = {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}. Step six pops CC8, which
is of diﬀerent nature, as it contains node 13, and ¬E(CC8, 13). Here, case 3
applies, we have to separate CC8 into two connected components, CC8,1 =
CC8 ∩ AttRS({13}) = {13, 15} and CC8,1 = CC8 − AttRS({13}) = {14, 16}.
Step 7 and 8 will then add CC8,1 to Y as it conforms to case 2, and CC8,2 to
X (case4). Similarly, CC2 will be added to Y and CC1 to X. The algorithm
terminates with X = {1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16} and Y = {2, 3, 4, 13, 15}.
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Fig. 6. Computing X and Y
Now that we have computed a set from which a node enabling information
encoding can be reached in a ﬁnite number of steps, we also have to deﬁne
winning subsets (in the Muller sense). Staying in Y is not suﬃcient to ensure
that information is transmitted: Y is not accurate enough. We cannot either
require that all nodes y such that ¬E(D, y) for some connected component
D appear inﬁnitely often, as the game can be stuck in a peculiar connected
component and remain a winning game for the pair {S,R}. Hence, we can
deﬁne the winning condition of our covert channel game as the Muller condi-
tion Win(Y ) = 2Y − {P ∈ 2Y | ∀n ∈ P,E(P, n)}. A node y ∈ Y such that
∃W ∈ Win(Y ) and ¬E(W, y) will be called an encoding node. The winning
subsets of Win(Y ) deﬁne the parts of the protocol that can be used by the
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sending instance to create a covert channel. For an attacker, staying in a
restricted part of the protocol behaviors (typically a small strongly connected
component of the HMSC graph) can be suﬃcient to transfer information. It
is convenient, as the sender needs fewer memory to implement a covert chan-
nel 4 , but makes a channel more vulnerable to monitoring applications that
compare users behaviors to proﬁles of honest users. Hence, a “good” strat-
egy for a sender is to use the larger possible part of the protocol to send
information while mimicking the behavior of honest users.
Proposition 5.4 Let GH = (AH,Win(Y )) be the Muller game associated to
H, with Y = ∅. From GH, one can compute a maximal strategy fY for nodes
controlled by S and R such that:
i) any inﬁnite run in Y that conforms to fY passes inﬁnitely often through
a set of encoding nodes.
ii) For all encoding node y and all v0, . . . vl such that v0 · · · vl.y is a path,
fY (v0 · · · vl.y) contains at least two transitions t1,t2 such that ΛR(Y, t1)∩
ΛR(Y, t2) = ∅.
Proof. If Y = ∅, then from the construction algorithm, ∀y ∈ Y , ∃D, ∃y ′ ∈
D, such that ¬E(D, y′) and y ∈ AttRS(y′). So, for all y ∈ Y , there is a
(positional) strategy leading from y to an encoding node. Hence, there exists
a strategy f that leads from any node to an encoding node, and from an
encoding node to another encoding node. As the number of encoding nodes is
ﬁnite, any play that conforms to this strategy passes inﬁnitely often through
a set of encoding nodes. Note however that this strategy f is not necessarily
maximal.
Let us build the parity automata PH associated to our Muller game. Let
us call K the size of PH . The states of our parity automata will be of the
form v1 . . . vk.y, with k < K. We can observe that a strategy for this parity
automata is in fact a sub-graph of PH . We can also note that a strategy in PH
will be a winning strategy if it does not allow passing inﬁnitely often through
a set of nodes
⋃
i∈I v1i . . . vki.yi that does not contain encoding nodes. Hence,
a strategy f will be a winning strategy iﬀ the subgraph of PH associated to f
does not contain a “silent cycle”, ie, a cycle on a set of states
⋃
i∈I v1i . . . vki.yi
that does not contain encoding nodes.
So, from a winning strategy f , one can add a chain leading from a node
4 The simple Bu¨chi condition Win(Y ) = Y − {y|∀W ⊆ Y,E(W, y)} is suﬃcient to exhibit
strategies which conform plays traverse some encoding nodes inﬁnitely often. However, a
Muller condition allows for strategies using larger parts of the speciﬁcation (that cannot
always be obtained by Bu¨chi conditions). With such strategies, covert channel use are more
likely to be similar to honest behaviors.
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to another if it does not create silent cycles. The new strategy computed will
be bigger (in terms of transitions allowed) than f .
After a certain number of additions, it will not be possible to add a single
transition to the strategy without creating a silent cycle, and the strategy
obtained will be maximal.
This proves point i) of proposition. Let us now prove point ii). Adding any
transition from a state s = v1 . . . vk.y where y is an encoding node to another
state s′v′1 . . . v
′
k.y
′ to a winning strategy f does not create silent cycles, as all
the new cycles created pass through s, and are hence not silent. 
Note that maximal winning strategies are not unique. Note also that this
proof just establishes the existence of a maximal winning strategy, but does
not provides the most eﬃcient algorithm to compute such strategy. In fact, to
solve our problem, a strategy only have to remember the set of visited states,
and not their order of appearance, which lets us suppose that the problem can
be solved as the research of a positional strategy on an automata of size n.2n
instead of the usual n.!n for Muller games.
Intuitively, the existence of two transitions with diﬀerent observable con-
sequences means that a bit can be encoded. Finding a winning strategy for
{S,R} just indicates that there is a possible information transfer, not that
this transfer is always decipherable by the receiver. For this, we have to build
a transducer that observes the behaviors of the system and outputs a decoded
message.
6 Building a transducer for message decoding
The message received by a receiving instance can be seen as a continuous ﬂow
of events, and its decoding will be correct only when this ﬂow can be properly
segmented to deduce the sequence of choices that have been performed by a
sender. Let Y be a winning set computed from H = (N,−→,B, n0), PH be
the parity game associated to the Muller game on Y with winning condition
Win(Y ). Let fY : Y
∗ −→ 2−→ be a maximal strategy computed from PH .
The transducer associated to fY is the transducer TfY = (Q,Σin,Σout, δ, QI , F )
where:
• Q = QI = dom(fY ), Σin =
⋃
b∈B
λR(b)
• Σout = {} ∪ {t = (y, b, y′) | ¬E(X, y) for some X ∈ Win(Y )}
• δ = {(w.y, σin, t, w′.y′) | w.y and w′.y′ are vertices of PH ,
(w.y, w′.y) is an edge of PH , ∃t = (y, b, y′) ∈ Y × B × Y,
σin = λR(b)∧t = (y, b, y′) ∈ fY (w.y)∧∃X ∈ Win(Y ),¬E(X, y)}
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∪{(w.y, σin, , w′.y′) | w.y and w′.y′ are vertices of PH , (w.y, w′.y) is an
edge of PH , ∃t = (y, b, y′) ∈ Y ×B × Y, σin = λR(b)
∧∀X ∈ 2Y , E(X, y)}
• F = {w.y ∈ Dom(fY ) | ¬E(X, y) for some X ∈ Win(Y )}
The transducer TfY reads observations of the receiving instance R, and
outputs the sequence of choices at encoding nodes that may have engendered
this observation (ie a list of transitions). When a transition is not leaving an
encoding node, it does not participate in the covert transmission, and it is
replaced by . The states of the transducer is the set of vertices computed for
the parity game PH , and the transitions are labeled by a pair σin/σout when a
transition is allowed by the strategy fY . When a transition t = (s, b, s
′) leaves
an encoding vertex, σout is the name of the transition, otherwise σout = . In
both cases, σin represents the observation of the receiver (σin = λR(b)).
Deﬁnition 6.1 Let T be a set of transitions leaving nodes controlled by S,
and such that ∀t = (y, b, y′), ∃t′ = (y, b′, y′′) originating from the same node.
One can deﬁne a partition P of T into two subsets T0 and T1 such that for all
y, ∃t0 = (y, b, y′) ∈ T0 ∧ ∃t1 = (y, b, y′′) ∈ T1.
For a given partition of a set T of transitions, let us deﬁne the interpre-
tation  P as the function  P : X ∪ {} −→ {T0, T1, } that associates the
corresponding partition to each transition of T ,  to , and also  to each
transition of X − T .
Theorem 6.2 Let H be a HMSC, and AH be the associated arena. Let Y
be the winning set computed on AH , and Win(Y ) be the winning conditions
included in Y . Let f be a strategy for Y,Win(Y ) and TfY be the transducer
associated to Y and f . If TfY is functional, then there exists an interpretation
 P such that:
∀y ∈ Y, ∀m ∈ {0, 1}∗, ∃p = t1. . . . tk with t1 = (y, b, y1) and TfY (λR(p))P ≡ m
Proof. By induction on the length of m.
For m = 0, for all y, there is a ﬁnite path p leading to a node y ′ such that
E(y′). Hence, there are at least two transitions t0, t1 such that ΛR(Y, t1) ∩
ΛR(t2) = ∅. Hence, there is a partition P = {T0, T1} with t0 ∈ T0 and t1 ∈ T1,
and then TfY (λR(p.t0))P ≡ 0 and TfY (λR(p.t1))P ≡ 1.
Let us suppose that this property is satisﬁed for any message of size ≤ n,
and let us show that it is also true for a message of size n+ 1.
As m is of size n + 1, m can be decomposed as m = m′.{0, 1}, with
|m′| = n. Hence, for any y there is a partition and a path p = t1 . . . tk such
that TfY (λR(p))P ≡ m. Furthermore, the path p leads to a node y ′, for
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which there exists a path p0 with TfY (λR(p0))P ≡ 0, and a path p1 with
TfY (λR(p1))P ≡ 1. Hence, for all y there is a path p′ = p0 or p′ = p1 from y
such that TfY (λR(p.p
′))P ≡ m′. 
Intuitively, this theorem says that is TfY is functional, the receiver can
decode messages generated to it by the strategy of the pair {S,R}. It gives
suﬃcient conditions for making possible an encoding of a message through
decisions in a protocol It is easy to see why this condition is only suﬃcient.
Consider the HMSC of Figure 7. A message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ of arbitrary length
can be encoded by scenario Datan.Close, where n is the number which binary
representation is m. We have only deﬁned the property for an encoding of
0 and 1 from encoding nodes, which is suﬃcient to characterize information
transmission. However, more accurate partitions of transition sets can be used
to transfer more than 1 bit at each encoding node. If a decision node y has
ny outgoing transitions with pairwise disjoint observable languages, then a
decision at node y can encode up to log2(ny) bits of information.
Determining if a transducer is functional is quadratic [8]. However, as
we are studying abstract and incomplete models, the size of the transducers
is usually small. Note also that transducer functionality can be replaced by
a simpler requirement. One can just ask the language on the receiving in-
stance to be a code [7]. This property detects less covert channels, but can be
computed very eﬃciently.
Sender Nertwork Receiver
close close
bMSC Close bMSC Data
Sender Nertwork Receiver
shortData
Data
Data Close
Fig. 7. A diﬀerent encoding
7 Conclusion and future work
This paper shows how to characterize the presence of covert channels from a
scenario representation H of a system. The ﬁrst step consists in identifying
a “live” subset of H from which a message encoding is possible in a bounded
number of decisions. Then, searching a maximal strategy in the live subset of
H and the construction of the transducer associated to this strategy allows us
to determine if a non ambiguous message transmission is possible. The fact
that the covert channel game is deﬁned as a Muller game, and that strategies
are maximal and non deterministic allows a wide range of behaviors that were
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possible in the initial speciﬁcation. This increases the capacity of our channels,
and makes online detection of obfuscated uses of a system harder (the more
normally a system behaves in presence of corrupted users, the harder it is to
detect a covert channel use).
Ambiguous transducers do not mean that covert information passing is im-
possible, but rather that the channel contains noise. A study to compute noisy
covert channels capacity using information theory is currently undergone. The
main diﬃculty to compute capacities and rates is that in the asynchronous
systems depicted by our scenarios, all encodings are not performed in constant
time. Note that to build an eﬃcient strategy, one does not need to remember
the order between visited nodes, but only the visited nodes since the last visit
of an encoding node. This lets us suppose that a more eﬃcient strategy may
be found.
So far, we have considered centralized strategies, where R can take deci-
sion to help S transmitting data. This provides necessary conditions for an
attack and synthesizes global scenarios exhibiting the channel. However, in a
distributed framework, such a strategy might not be implementable without
introducing additional ambiguity, due to the fact that instances {S,R} only
have a partial view of the system. Finally, we only considered a pair {S,R}
of attackers. An extension of this work is to study when a team of processes
can create a covert channel. This includes several senders and receivers, and
processes being able to act successively as senders or as receivers. However, if
considering several senders seems very easy with our approach, having several
receivers raises some more complicated issues, and potentially undecidable
problems. When several receivers are considered for the encoded message,
projections on a set of processes is not necessarily a regular language, and
ﬁnding encoding nodes (which relies on language intersection emptiness) may
become an undecidable problem.
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